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Abstract 
This study explores the processes of trade credit relationship development and enforcement 
by SME entrepreneurs and the role of trust in a developing economy context. Drawing on 
institutional, trade credit and trust theories data was collected and analysed from 16 SMEs 
owner/managers trading across cultures using qualitative interview approach and thematic 
analysis. The results show that SMEs develop and enforce trade credit relationships through 
their embeddedness in institutional contexts. Secondly, they use personal trust and specific 
social-cultural norms in the enforcement of trade credit agreements in absence of formal 
institutional trust. Conclusion, implications, limitations and further studies are delineated. 
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Introduction  
 Apart from bank financing, trade credit is the next most important source of external 
financing for SME entrepreneurs in both developed and developing countries (Demirgüç-Kunt 
and Maksimovic 2001; Wilson 2014; Carbo-Valverdes, Rodrigues-Fernandez, and Udell 
2016). Although trade credit serves as a source of financing for SMEs selling and buying 
(Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano 2010; Fisman and Love 2003) and enhances profitability 
and growth (Martinnez-Sola, Garcia-Teruel, and Matinez-Solano 2014), the delay in payments 
entail risks.  Trust in trade credit relationships, therefore, helps to reduce the risks and enable 
small businesses to mobilise financial resources (Berger and Udell 2006).  
 
Most studies in the extant literature have analysed trade credit determinants of large firms with 
only a few on SMEs in developed economies, particularly the US and Europe with strong 
institutions and accessible enterprise support for smaller businesses (Carbo-Valverdes, 
Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell 2016).  In contrast, SMEs in developing economies with 
weak institutions, do not often receive such financial support and often rely on trust-based 
relationships to access financial resources such as trade credit (Amoako and Matlay 2015; 
Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano 2010; Fisman and Love 2003).     In spite of the 
importance of trust in trade credit relationships to SMEs in developing economies, there is a 
dearth of studies that examine specific dimensions of trust (Li 2016b) in SMEs trade credit 
relationships in developing economy context and how these affect trade credit development, 
management processes and practices (Carbo-Valverdes, Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell 
2016). It is imperative therefore, to explore the dimensions of trust in SMEs trade credit 
development and management processes as well as practices in developing economies because 
it determines their growth and profitability (Pike and Nam Sang Cheng 2001).  
  
In this article, we define trade credit as the type of credit offered when a firm purchases goods 
or services and the payments are delayed (Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano 2010).   
Trust is important in starting and growing new businesses (Welter 2012). For SMEs in 
particular, it is critical for building networks and accessing information from the network 
partners to gain market knowledge in distant markets (Altinay, Saunders, and Wang 2014) and 
resources such as credit (Moro, Lucas, and Kodwani 2012). Although trust is multi-faceted, 
multidimensional with different definitions and conceptualisations (Li 2016b), it is often 
characterised with perceptions of benevolence, empathy, openness, loyalty and dedication 
((Mayer, Davis, and Schoorman 1995;Nooteboom 2002; Klein, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom 
2005).  It is generally agreed that the creation and maintenance of trust within credit 
relationships is a fundamental condition for the existence of trade credit and the financial 
services industry in both developed and developing countries. Thus, trust plays an important 
role in sustaining credit relationships (Moro, Lucas, and Kodwani 2012). Therefore, the main 
research question this article addresses is how does trust allow customer/supplier trade credit 
relationships to develop and be managed in weak institutional context?  
  
We contribute to the understanding of trade credit and the role of trust in the following ways.  
First, it fills a gap in the literature through empirically exploring the development and 
management of SMEs trade credit relationships in a developing economy context. Second, we 
propose a model of entrepreneurial trade credit relationships and trust in a developing 
economy into the entrepreneurship, SMEs and trade credit literature. The model highlights the 
role of personal trust, parallel institutional trust based on social norms and cultural institutions 
in the development and enforcement of trade credit agreements in the context of weak legal 
institutions. Third, this study explores how trust sheds light on the dark side of trade credit. 
The extant literature documents the liquidity risks associated with long payment terms, which 
can drive credit, constrained businesses into distress (Barrot, 2016). It also emphasises 
liquidity fluctuations and payment default by credit-constrained customers due to their over-
reliance on liquidity provided by SMEs.  Our study provides empirical evidence of how 
entrepreneurs and SMEs in weak institutions use trust to manage and enforce trade credit 
agreements in such circumstances. Fourth, this article confirms the embeddedness of 
entrepreneurs in institutional context; but extends this through exploring how to respond to 
institutional weaknesses through the development of trust in trade credit relationships 
embedded in institutional contexts and social relations (Li 2016a; Granovetter 1985).  It 
further explores how the institutional context within a specific developing economy affect the 
trust processes and trade credit enforcement.  Finally, we selected Ghana for this exploratory 
study because currently, small businesses constitute a substantial part of the Ghanaian 
economy. SMEs constitute 92% of all companies and contribute not less than 70% of GDP 
(Peprah, Mensah, and Akosah 2016). However, like most developing countries SMEs have 
limited survival and growth due to a number of institutional constraints, notably, the lack of 
access to bank finance and limited support of the legal systems in the country (Robson and 
Freel 2008; Amoako and Lyon 2014; Peprah, Mensah, and Akosah 2016). Therefore, 
entrepreneurs rely on personalised networks and relationships underpinned by a range of less 
formal forms of trust building to access and enforce trade credit agreements.  
     The next section reviews literature on institutional theory, trade credit and trust in 
entrepreneurship. The methods are then discussed and the findings presented. The discussions 
and conclusions then relate the findings to theoretical developments and implications for 




Institutional theory, entrepreneurial trade credit relationships and trust development 
     Institutions influence how entrepreneurs and firms in a country attain their economic 
aspirations and ultimately the growth of the economy. Institutions ‘affect the performance of 
the economy by their cost on exchange and performance’ (North 1990:4-5).   In this article, we 
define institutions as ‘the rules of the game in a society, or more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction’ (North, 1990:3).  These rules are categorised 
broadly as formal and informal institutions (North 1990; Scott 2008). Formal institutions are 
rules and procedures that are created, communicated and enforced through channels widely 
accepted as official. In contrast, informal institutions are defined as socially shared rules, 
usually unwritten, that are created, communicated, and enforced outside of officially 
sanctioned channels (Helmke and Levitsky, 2004). Whilst rule-based, formal institutions 
support ‘arms-length transactions’ and economic exchanges in developed economies, 
relationship-based, informal institutions support personalised exchanges in developing 
countries (Peng 2003). 
In each context, institutions provide the different forms of embeddedness that encourage or 
discourage trustworthy behaviour (Welter 2012; Welter and Smallbone 2006, 2011). 
Embeddedness broadly refers to the ‘mechanism whereby an entrepreneur becomes part of the 
structure and it may constrain or create opportunities’ (Jack and Anderson 2002:467). In 
particular, networks underpinned by trust offer resources such as trade credit for the 
entrepreneur.  
 
Institutions and trade credit  
The type of institutions also affect trade credit. In countries with well-developed financial and 
banking systems, it is more convenient for firms to secure funds from financial institutions 
whilst in less developed financial markets, the sources of funds shifts to non-financial 
suppliers (Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimivic 2001). Similarly, well-developed legal systems 
also determines the enforcement of trade credit by providing legal protection for creditors and 
allowing trade creditors to enforce contracts or to repossess collaterals (Demirguc-Kunt and 
Maksimivic 2001).  Further, the culture of a given country also impact on trade credit (Wu, 
Firth, and Rui 2014).   
In the context of developing countries, the weak institutions and lack of access to formal forms 
of finance render trade credit a critical form of finance for SMEs (Bruton, Bruton, Ahlstrom, and 
Li 2010; Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano 2010a). In these contexts, financial institutions and 
contract enforcements are weak and as a result, financial institutions are less willing to give 
finance and letters of credit to SME entrepreneurs (Antras and Foley 2014; Amoako and Lyon 
2014). Therefore, entrepreneurs rely on informal sources of finance particularly trade credit 
based on social and business networks that allow creditors to collect information about debtors’ 
reputation (El Ghoul and Zheng 2016; Amoako and Matlay 2015) and networks that sanction 
defaulters.  The cooperation within these networks are also based on trust and as a result, trust 
plays an important role in trade credit (Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 2004). Entrepreneurs 
therefore rely on trust in social relationships to strategically use trade credit to increase their 
sales and enhance growth of their firms (r and Love 2003; Berger and Udell 2006; Wu, Firth, 
and Rui 2014).  
Micro determinants of trade credit 
In addition to the macro determinants the literature suggests that firm-level factors also impact 
on trade credit. At the firm level, the firms’s creditworthiness, which refers to the firm’s credit 
capacity, reputation and ability to obtain alternative finance influences the ability to extend 
trade credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1997; Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, 2010a; Wilson 
and Summers, 2002). Hence, it is argued that old and large firms have better credit reputation 
compared to young and smaller firms due to their long history, economies of scale (Schwartz, 
1974) and better access to bank credit (Petersen and Rajan, 1997).  
 
A firm’s ability to generate internal cash is also another firm specific factor. Internal cash 
generation refers to how much profit a firm can generate by itself during a specific period. 
Simlilarly, a firm that has the ability to access financial debt has the capacity to extend more 
trade credit to partners.  
 
The cost of financial debt also influences trade credit. Garcia-Teruel and Martinez-Solano 
(2010) define cost of financial debt as the cost of debt divided by the total liability less 
accounts payable. When costs of financial debt are high, there are less incentives for firms to 
offer trade credit. Instead, there are incentives to rely on trade credit from suppliers. The 
converse is also possible as during periods with high financial costs, the cost of bank loans 
could become higher and as a result, firms may increase trade credit (Nilsen 2002). Trade 
credit is also linked to firm’s sales growth strategy. Firms that aim for higher sales growth 
accept more trade credit to boost their account receivable (Rajan 1997). Also, firms with low 
sales growth can boost growth by extending more trade credit to increase sales (Wilson and 
Summers 2002). Firms also offer more trade credit to customers when there is higher gross 
profit margin (Petersen and Rajan 1997; Garcia-Teruel and Martino-Solano 2010a). Yet, firms 
and entrepreneurs extend trade credit to customers/suppliers based on trust.   
 
Trust in entrepreneurial relationships 
     Trust is a complex concept that has been defined differently in the literature without much 
consensus (Li 2016b; Welter 2012). In this article, trust is defined as “an expectation that 
things or people will not fail us, or neglect or lack of awareness of the possibility of failure, 
even if there are perceived opportunities and incentives for it” (Nooteboom 2002 p. 48). This 
definition is appropriate for this article based on the uncertain institutional contexts in which 
entrepreneurs in Ghana operate. Entrepreneurs rely on trust based on the personal 
characteristics, past behaviour and demonstrated honesty of their partners (Nooteboom 2002), 
and the expectations that their partners will not default; even though, in cases of default these 
agreements cannot be enforced in a court of law in Ghana. Trust therefore refers to the 
entrepreneur’s intentions to be vulnerable.    
 
     The literature suggests that there are two types of trust- personal trust and institutional or 
system trust.  Personal trust is based on social systems, organisations and institutions and it is 
not based on codified rules and regulations, but rather on implicit obligations in social 
networks (Zucker 1986; Lyon and Porter 2009). It also results from social and emotional 
bonds between friends and family members. Personal trust and network ties facilitate 
entrepreneurship through offering greater opportunities for the development of economic 
relationships (Welter 2012), opportunity recognition (Jack and Anderson 2002), and enabling 
business creation. To SMEs, involved in international trade, trust based relationships of the 
entrepreneur be it between customers, suppliers or other agents are critical to their survival and 
growth (Oviatt and McDougall 2005; Mustafa and Chen 2010; Amoako and Lyon 2014). In 
particular, trust in relationships facilitates access to trade credit in international markets 
(Fisman and love 2003; Antras and Foley 2014).   
 
     Institutional trust can be developed based on strong formal institutions such as courts that 
enforce contracts, intermediary organisations such as government agencies and banks or 
individuals who are trusted by the two parties (Klein, Hillebrand, and Nooteboom 2005; 
Zucker 1986). Nevertheless, actors in inter-firm relationships benefit from reliable institutions 
only if they trust those institutions (Mollering 2006). Hence, in uncertain institutional contexts 
such as those found in developing economies where there are weak formal institutions, the 
development of institutional trust is low and interpersonal trust may complement or substitute 
for institutional trust (Li 2016a).  
 
 In inter-organisational relationships, trust is influenced by the attitudes, characteristics and 
behaviour of entrepreneurs, managers and other boundary spanners who influence the norms 
of interfirm opportunism or cooperation (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998). Yet, trust in 
entrepreneurial relationships can also be developed based on the characteristics of a firm, 
industry or association (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998; Gillespie and Dietz 2009). 
However, scholars disagree on whether organisations can be trusted because, originally, trust 
is regarded as an individual-level phenomenon (Levi 1998; Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 
1998). Instead, scholars argue that formal organisations can be viewed as forms of institutions 
(Welter and Smallbone 2006) in this way organisational trust is subsumed in institutional trust. 
Hence, in this article, organisational trust is subsumed in both personal and institutional trust. 
This is due to the owner/managers’ dominant role as key boundary spanners and decision 
makers for their organisations (Zaheer, McEvily, and Perrone 1998).   
 
Trust and trade credit relations 
 Trust plays an important role in trade credit and the creation and maintenance of trust 
relationships are a fundamental condition of their existence ((Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales 
2004). Nonetheless, the level and determinants of trust in inter-organisational relationships in 
any given context is also influenced by cultural norms (Saunders, Skinner, Dietz, Gillespie, 
and Lewicki 2010; Zaheer and Kamal 2011), and more so in trade credit relationships in 
contexts with weak institutions (Wu, Firth, and Rui 2014). Yet, current research on trade credit 
mostly focus on surveys to analyse firm specific and macro environmental determinants in 
developed countries (e.g. Berger and Udell, 2006; Garcia-Teruel and Martino-Solano, 2010), 
while paying less attention to the characteristics and behaviour of entrepreneurs (trustors) and 
trade debtors (trustees) in the processes of trust development and the role of trust and cultural 
institutions within trade credit relationships and how they enable trade credit to be accessed 
and enforced in countries with weak institutions norms (Wu, Firth, and Rui 2014) .   
In the context of international business, it is known that the size of trade credit correlates with 
the level of trust within relationships between trading partners; yet, very little is known about 
how trust in trade credit is developed and how trade credit payments are enforced in 
developing economy contexts where there are weak institutions (Antras and Foley 2014; 
Cowton and San-Jose 2017). In these contexts, entrepreneurs have less recourse to formal 
forms of finance from financial institutions such as banks (El Ghoul and Zheng 2016; Amoako 
and Matlay 2015), hence trade credit management and practices may determine liquidity and 
profitability (Pike and Nam Sang Cheng 2001) and may impact on trust development in trade 
credit relationships.  
 
This article addresses these gaps of how trust allows trade credit relationships to develop and 
be managed in a developing economy context. It particularly investigates how trade credit is 
enforced paying particular attention to the roles of; the entrepreneur (trustor), the partner 
(trustee) and cultural specific norms in a developing economy context where financial and 
legal institutions are less developed.  
     Figure 1 sums up the conceptual framework developed from the literature. It shows that 
entrepreneurs’ embeddedness in institutions shapes their trust building processes in trade 
credit relationships. Whilst in developed countries with strong formal institutions, 
entrepreneurs rely mostly on formal finance and trade credit to support and grow their 
businesses, in developing economies with weak institutions, such financial support is very rare 
and entrepreneurs rely on informal forms of financing particularly trade credit to grow their 
businesses. While institutional trust based on strong legal systems underpin accessing and 
enforcing trade credit in developed economies, in developing economies, entrepreneurs rely on 
personal trust and parallel institutional trust in less formal institutions and social relations to 
access or enforce trade credit agreements.  
                                           
[Insert Figure1 here] 
Methodology 
     This study employed a qualitative research approach to explore and understand the 
respondents’ interpretations of trust building in SME trade credit relationships due to the 
novelty of the topic. The qualitative research was appropriate for this study due to the limited 
research on trust in trade credit relationship, which is embedded in developing economy 
context, and the entrepreneur’s interactions and meanings (Crotty, 1998). The approach is also 
synonymous with entrepreneurship studies using institutional theory.   
 
Using the purposive sampling technique (e.g. Amoako and Lyon 2014) 16 cases of SMEs 
were selected from the services and manufacturing sectors, eight from each sector comprising 
of eight SMEs selling specifically to customers from West Africa and another eight from 
markets outside West Africa. The two sectors and markets were selected to enable an 
investigation into the similarities and differences between the markets and the sectors (see 
Constanzo, Vurro, Foster, Servato, and Perrini 2014). The differences between the two sectors 
may accrue from the intangible nature of services compared to manufactured goods that are 
tangible and can in most cases be retrieved if the creditor defaults. The cultural norms at play 
between the West African and International markets are also different and therefore it is 
expected that trust development and trade credit practices may be different between the two 
markets (Wu, Firth, and Rui 2014). The 16 multiple cases used assisted to uncover the key 
themes in the study (Guest, Bunce, and Johnson 2006), and facilitated the study of patterns 
related to the two different markets and sectors (Miles and Huberman 1994; Yin 2009). Since 
there is no single list of small firms in Ghana (Robson and Freel 2008), these quotas were 
selected based on visits to Chamber of Commerce meetings, export forums, trade fairs, ports 
and open markets. Between 30 June 2014 and 31 August 2014, 15 owner/managers and a 
manager were contacted and interviewed (see Table1) for the profiles of the entrepreneurs and 
their firms. Entrepreneurs owning and managing 16 SMEs were interviewed and the in-depth 
exploratory semi- structured interviews enabled an in-depth understanding of complex and 




[Insert Table 1 here] 
 
     Primary data was collected through semi-structured interviews lasting between one hour 
and one hour thirty minutes with each of the respondents. The interviews were done at the 
workplace or entrepreneurs’ home, depending on where they felt comfortable. After the first 
round of interviews and the initial analysis, a follow-up interview lasting 25-30 minutes with 
each of the 16 entrepreneurs was conducted during summer 2015. This helped to explore 
deeper into emergent themes, particularly on the processes involved in how entrepreneurs 
developed trust in trade credit relations.  
 
     During the conversations, a critical incident technique was used to investigate how 
entrepreneurs reacted to incidents that happened. The critical incident technique allowed the 
capture of very critical subjective meanings that are essential elements of understanding how 
entrepreneurs developed trust. More information was requested on issues relating to 
dimensions of trust judgement, and the role of indigenous institutions in trust building and 
trade credit relations, and it was ensured that misinterpretations during the interviews were 
minimized through seeking clarification on salient issues. The interviews were transcribed and 
the data analysed manually by firstly using open coding (Corbin and Strauss 2008; Altinay, 
Saunders, and Wang 2014) to identify the concepts that have emerged and grouped them into 
categories to generate the first-order concepts. At this stage, the respondents’ descriptions, and 
the key terms and phrases as well as issues were categorized to facilitate the identification of 
similar issues from the data. This was followed by the axial coding which entailed identifying 
the relationship between trust and the development of trade credit which resulted in the 
categorisation of the first-order themes into second-order categories (Corbin and Strauss 
2008). The second-order themes were then aggregated into trust dimensions based on the 
original data (see figures 2 and 3), and mapped to the initial conceptual framework in figure 1 
to explain the relationship. The themes and categories were reviewed several times to confirm 
the validity and refined into a coherent framework (Figure 4), that explains trust development 
and enforcement of trade credit in a developing economy. From the analysis, we observed two 
broad approaches to how trust is developed based on the actions and characteristics of the 
partner as well as on the context and particularly on the social, cultural and industry norms. 
We also uncovered the approaches used by entrepreneurs to enforce trade credit agreements. 
We used manual coding in order to thoroughly interrogate the data due to the small sample 
involved in the study and the importance to focus on depth and meaning rather than volume 
and breadth of the data (John and Johnson, 2002). This was important as while software like 
NVIVO can add rigour to the analysis of qualitative data particularly with large data sets, there 
is evidence that the existence of multiple synonyms and the way different respondents express 
similar ideas differently in different contexts might lead to partial retrieval of information (see 
Welsh, 2002; Brown et al 1990). Given the complex nature of trust and the influence of 
context on trust perceptions of trustworthy behaviour, it was important to manually scrutinise 
the data to ensure that all the expressions of trust were fully captured.  
[Insert Figure 2 here] 
[Insert Figure 3 here] 
 
 Using the initial conceptual model developed as a basis, we developed a framework of the 
processes of building trust within trade credit relationships between the entrepreneurs and their 
trade credit partners in a developing economy from our empirical findings. The analysis also 
focused on how the context (Welter, 2012), particularly the social relationships and informal 
institutions shape trust building in trade credit relationships and how trust enhances the 
enforcement of trade credit in an environment characterised by weak institutions. The next 




Trust development in trade credit relationships 
   In this section, we presented the findings of the study using the developed framework from 
the empirical findings in Figure 4 below.  The first part explains how the embeddedness of 
entrepreneurs in institutions in their context assist with the development of trust in trade credit 
relationships. The second part then explores the types and the specific dimensions of trust 
developed in entrepreneurial trade credit relationships, and the final part discusses how trust is 
used to enforce trade credit contracts. 
 
[Insert Figure 4] 
 
Entrepreneur’s embeddedness in institutional contexts in Ghana 
     The results from the analysis depicted in Figure 4 show that all the entrepreneurs draw on 
their embeddedness in the institutional context for building trust in entrepreneurial trade credit 
relationships. Even though their trust decisions were made based on strategies for their firms 
and how they perceived trustworthiness, the (weak) formal institutions and informal 
institutions in the country influenced their trust judgements and those decisions.  
Interestingly, the vast majority of the entrepreneurs made repeated references to the lack of 
access to finance from the banks as a barrier to their activities and therefore their reliance on 
trust in relationships to enhance access to trade credit.  An exporter of beads explained the 
predicament of entrepreneurs in the following words: ‘Four years ago I went to my bank, I 
needed money to grow my business and they asked me to bring collateral like a four-year old 
car which I didn’t have’ (Number 9). Another barrier to entrepreneurs is the lack of assistance 
from the courts on effective contract enforcement. A hotelier summed it up in these words: 
‘the legal system is not very supportive, it takes too long to resolve disputes with business 
partners and I may have to pay money to people like the judge in the court which is a waste’ 
(Number 1). The lack of trust in the legal system means that entrepreneurs have to rely on 
personal trust and trust in alternative institutions such as trade associations in offering trade 
credit to partners.  
 
Trade credit and trust in entrepreneurial relationships  
     All the entrepreneurs stated that they had offered trade credit to their key customers and 
suppliers in domestic, West African and intercontinental markets within the past year. Trade 
credit varied from delaying payments for goods to the advancement of smaller amounts of 
cash loans towards capital investments. The trade credit management practices employed by 
the entrepreneurs also varied and the length of time for repayment ranged from a few weeks to 
months, depending on the nature of the specific relationship, market, industry and association.  
 
The entrepreneurs emphasised the importance of trade credit to the competitiveness of their 
businesses. From the analysis, trade credit extension to customers and suppliers helped to 
boost sales and facilitate reliable supplies. Thus, entrepreneurs who do not offer trade credit to 
their suppliers or customers could find themselves at a disadvantage compared to their 
competitors who were prepared to offer it. An entrepreneur who exports to Canada, USA and 
UK markets pointed this out in these words:  
…There is competition in the business so it is those of us who are able to support the suppliers 
with credit that get the supplies (Case 6).  
 
     The next section explores how the processes and dimensions of trust are employed by 
entrepreneurs in weak institutions to extend trade credit to their partners and mitigate the 
challenges they encounter in their trade credit relationships.  
 
Dimensions of trust judgements in trade credit relationships 
     The responses from the entrepreneurs in relation to their decisions to offer trade credit to 
trusted partners revealed that trust is developed based on the trade credit partner’s honesty, 
capacity to pay, willingness to pay and liquidity concerns based on payment history. Further, 
the entrepreneurs drew on family/kinship/friendship norms, trade associations, the industry 
and reputation of their partners to develop trust in their potential trade debtors.  
 
[Insert Table 2 here] 
 
Honesty and trust development in trade credit relationships. It was found that all the 
entrepreneurs advanced trade credit to customers or suppliers who they perceived to be honest.            
To the entrepreneurs, honest partners are those customers and suppliers who were truthful to 
their words. The following quotes from the Shea butter processor confirms this:“…they must 
be honest, they must be straight forward and they must be able to abide by their word” 
(number 7).  Hence, the entrepreneurs’ trusted partners are the ones who spoke the truth. 
Interestingly, to the entrepreneurs, speaking the truth was closely linked to keeping promises 
to pay trade credit. The processor of fruits echoed their views: “…Basically, it is about 
payments; after trying the owner/manager of my key partner company and having observed 
how he kept their promises with regards to payments, I became impressed and trusted them” 
(Number 8). However, the processor of spices exercised caution with trusting partners and said  
that: “we start a little at a time” (Number 5). Honest partners therefore, are the ones that have 
been  tested over a number of transactions.  
 
Capacity to pay and trust development in trade credit relationships. 
The data revealed that to start a trade credit relationship, three quarters of entrepreneurs paid 
visits to the working places and homes of (potential) trade credit partners to ascertain their 
honesty and their capacity to pay.  The visits are important to entrepreneurs since in the 
Ghanaian and in the West African context, there is  lack of credit history of individuals and 
companies therefore, knowing where trade credit partners worked and lived was a priority to 
the entrepreneurs for developing trust. The following excerpt support this finding: 
“We don’t agree with every proposal for trade credit. First we visit the company to see where 
the company is located, assess their assets and check if what the manager told us about the 
company’s capacity to pay is true” (Number 12). 
     Further, the entrepreneurs also assessed the trade credit partners’ sales.  Assessing the 
ability to sell was critical as it reflected the cash flow of the potential trade credit debtor and 
hence their capacity to pay. A fashion designer explained that: “…I give credit to customers, 
from the onset I see how much you can buy, distribute and sell before I decide” (Number 14).  
 
Willingness to pay and trust development in trade credit relationships. The results further 
show that half of the entrepreneurs offered trade credit to customers and suppliers who 
voluntarily invited them to their homes and business places. A Wholesaler of African beads 
explained that “…Most of them even invite me to their houses to let me know where they are 
so in case they default I’ll go to their business place and house” (Number 9). The manufacturer 
of cocoa products also explained the importance of accepting to visit – “…I accept invitations 
to visit the person and if the person can be located, is honest and would not run away with my 
money, but would come back to pay, I will give them the credit” (Number 15). 
 
     The invitations to customers and suppliers’ homes and business places is very important 
because it enables the entrepreneurs to locate their potential trade creditors in cases of default. 
Interestingly, only two entrepreneurs took a greater risk by extending trade credit to partners 
they did not know based on their gut feelings. But, this happened when the customers 
voluntarily provided the details of their homes and or business locations to the entrepreneurs 
to signify their willingness to pay. The exporter of Kente cloth (colourful traditional cloth) 
illustrated that: “…I trusted them and gave them the goods on credit and when I went to their 
home, they paid the money back to me and that is where the story started” (Number 3).  
     Another indication of a partner’s willingness to pay cited by a quarter of the entrepreneurs 
was the reciprocal sharing of market information. A hotel manager explained why: 
“We talk regularly and if he has difficulty and cannot meet payment deadlines he explains to 
me as we talk; we have good communication and so he trusts me and I trust him” (Number 2). 
 
Liquidity concerns and trade credit development in entrepreneurial relationships 
The final indicator of trust in trade credit relationships is liquidity concerns. The 
entrepreneurs stated that the part payment for goods or services supplied or timely payment 
of trade credit by partners is a key determinant of trust in trade credit relationships. Part-
payment is particularly important when the trade credit relationship is relatively new and trust 
was not fully developed. An entrepreneur exporting to the USA explained that: “When the 
customer has not bought from us for a long time, we insist on at least a 50% part-payment 
and then the rest after delivery. This arrangement gives us enough money to operate and 
those that agree to these terms can be trusted” (Case 8).  
In both new and old trade credit relationships, in cases of default, the relationship were either 
be maintained or terminated based on the credible reasons or explanations given by the 
partner to assure the entrepreneur that delayed payments were not their fault and would not 
be repeated. In contrast, in cases of trade credit default where partners had not offered 
credible explanations the relationships were terminated due to liquidity concerns.  
 
Informal (parallel) institutions and trust development in trade credit relationships  
The critical analysis of the data showed that apart from the behaviour of the trade credit 
partners, trust judgements were influenced by the specific cultural norms of indigenous 
institutions in Ghana. These were the norms of: family/kinship/friendship, trade association 
and industry as well as reputation.  
 
[Insert Table 3 here] 
Norms of family/kinship and friendships and trust development. Norms of ‘family/kinship’ and 
friendship are important in building trust with partners. Hence, all the entrepreneurs referred to 
their close trade credit partners as family members even though they were not necessarily 
family members or personal friends. A hotel manager who referred to a trade credit partner as 
a sister illustrated: “…As I told you she is my sister but not real sister, but she is my sister 
because we trust and support each other just like sisters” (Number 1). The response from a 
manufacturer of beads explained how norms of family shaped trust in trade credit 
relationships: “…After sometime we get to know each other better and we become like a 
family so we help each other” (Number 6). Based on family and friendship norms all the 
entrepreneurs accepted invitations to attend social functions like funerals and weddings and 
other family events of particular local customers and suppliers. 
Norms of religion and trust development. Religious norms were also influential in the 
development of trust in trade credit relationships in domestic and West African trade. Nearly a 
third of the entrepreneurs mentioned that shared norms of religion promoted trust building due 
to shared faith, beliefs and values. Evidence of the role of religious beliefs came from 
references to the norms of brotherliness, fairness, reciprocity and prayers. An engineer 
explained how Islamic values cemented relationships between him and his customer in 
neighbouring countries. “…We Muslims, are brothers and when we meet another Muslim in 
another country we regard him as one of us and so we understand each other in this business” 
(Case 10). Similarly, a Christian who exports beads explained that : “…She is a Christian and 
I am also a Christian and both of us believe in fairness and helping one another and so we get 
along very well” (Case 9). 
     As declared by the two entrepreneurs, religious beliefs and values helped to build trust 
among some of the entrepreneurs and their partners. Interestingly, about two thirds of 
respondents expressed that they did not consider religious affiliations in choosing whom to 
offer trade credit and their credit relationships spanned religions. Another informal institution 
that was repeatedly cited as promoting trust building was trade associations.    
Norms of trade association/industry and trust development. In the absence of strong legal and 
enterprise supporting formal institutions in Ghana and West Africa, all the entrepreneurs were 
found to be members of trade associations. The association norms enhanced trust building 
based on friendships and sharing of information (mostly through gossip) on colleagues’ 
honesty and whereabouts to potential customers in domestic and international markets. In 
domestic and West African markets, the associations developed culturally specific norms 
regarding the provision of credit. The norms, however, differed based on the industry and the 
local context. All the entrepreneurs who extended credit emphasised that repayment of credit 
was the most important indicator of trustworthiness. 
Reputation and trust development. Trust in trade credit relationship could also be developed 
based on the partner’s reputation at home, workplace, community or in the trade association. 
An entrepreneur who is a member of the Cashew Processors and Exporters Association 
(CASPEA) explained that: “…I supply fruits on credit to a customer who is also a member of 
the association. He was recommended to me as very good in the (export) sector and everybody 
in the association knows that” (Number 4).  
During the visits to the homes and working places of (potential) partners, the entrepreneurs 
interacted with family and community members to collect information on their partners’ 
reputation based on gossip, before agreeing to extend trade credit to them. The cocoa 
processor explained: “When I visit, I ask some few people around you, if they say you're 
trustworthy then I will give the goods to you on credit (Number 15). 
Trust was also based on intermediaries who testify to the reputation of partners by serving as 
witnesses during trade credit agreements between a fifth of the entrepreneurs and customers 
they had never met. The intermediaries served as witnesses who might be summoned in cases 
of default.  
 
     While norms and reputation underpinned trust development processes in both the 
manufacturing and service sectors as well as the domestic and West African markets, they 
were not considered to be very relevant in markets outside West Africa, particularly, in the 
West because of the prevalence of stronger formal institutions that are often used for contract 
enforcement in such markets.  
    The key challenge faced by the entrepreneurs is the enforcement of trade credit agreements 
in relationships based on trust and this is explored in more detail in the next section. 
 
 
Trade credit enforcement 
     Trade credit enforcement was identified as a major challenge as all the entrepreneurs 
recounted their experiences with some customers and suppliers who breached trade credit 
terms by for example a) disappearing after receiving goods, services or cash on credit b) not 
paying trade credit on time  c) telling lies about the time of depositing trade credit money at 
the bank. 
 
     To mitigate these breaches and enforce trade credit agreements, thirteen entrepreneurs did 
not go to court but instead relied on trust. In domestic and West African markets, 
entrepreneurs indicated that personal trust and trust in indigenous institutions particularly 
family/kinship, trade associations and religion enabled them to enforce trade credit 
agreements. The use of these institutions was enhanced by entrepreneurs’ knowledge of the 
homes, business places, family members, church leaders and trade associations of their trade 
credit partners.  
 
     In cases of trade credit default, a third of entrepreneurs contacted family members of the 
partner to solicit for help in getting their goods or their money back. An entrepreneur shared 
her experience on contacting family members: 
“…Sometimes I could also go to the husband, mother or any family member to complain if I 
know them and in all such cases the money is paid back to me” (Case 7). 
The norms of the family require members to guard the reputation of the family and as a result, 
they might serve as guarantors, advice the debtor to pay and even pay the debt in certain 
circumstances. Family and kinship norms, therefore, remain an important institution that 
enhances the offering and enforcement of trade credit in entrepreneurial relationships in Ghana 
and West Africa.  
  
     A small minority (only two) of the entrepreneurs explained that when they did not know 
the homes and family members of their trade credit partners, they went to the shops and 
working places of their partners who defaulted and physically removed their own products and 
at times other products that were equal to the amount owed. However, this approach was used 
only in the domestic market due to the potential resistance and violence that could ensue 
should the debtor refuse to cooperate. Given security concerns and the complexities in legal 
systems in West African markets, six of the entrepreneurs recounted that they preferred to rely 
on leaders of trade associations to enforce trade credit payments. The trade associations served 
as ‘parallel courts’ that used the norms of the associations to resolve disputes and enforce trade 
credit payments. The fashion designer explained how trade association works in a West 
African market:   
 I can go and see the trade officer at the embassy in Abuja for him to find a lawyer for me. But 
you imagine the money involved and the time. That is why I belong to the association there, 
they settle payment problems quickly and free of charge (Case 14). 
Two of the entrepreneurs stated that in places where there were no trade associations they 
relied on intermediaries particularly embassy staff and trade fair organisers. A fashion 
designer explained her experience in a West African market in the quote below:  
“…I felt very bad and stopped with my customer in Nigeria…He delayed me and the time I 
should have left, passed by. Even it was the organisers of the fair who intervened otherwise 
maybe he wouldn't have given me all the money” (Case 13). 
 
     Religious norms were also deployed in enforcing trade credit payments. About a third of 
the entrepreneurs had relied on prayers and religious leaders, including Pastors and Ministers 
of religion, Muslim leaders (Imams) and traditional priests (Akomfoo) instead of the courts in 
mediating disputes and to enforce trade credit agreements with partners in domestic and West 
African markets. An auto engineer and a hotelier explained their use of religion in the quotes 
below respectively: 
“The court processes is too long and then you spend a lot of money; so it is better for me to 
pray and leave everything into God's hand and I believe in the word of God that say he will 
rebuke every devourer for my sake” (Case 10).  
“At times I talk to my pastor to pray for me or the pastor of the debtor to intervene or take an 
egg and tell the person that I am going to ‘Botwerewa” (traditional god in Ghana) to invoke 
curses on them; some people get scared because they have beliefs in those gods” (Number 2). 
 
     Religion, therefore, provides avenues for trade credit advancement based on trust in fellow 
believers, and prayers, religious leaders and deities assist in enforcing trade credit agreements. 
However, religion was less effective in international markets outside West Africa.  
 
   A quarter of the entrepreneurs experienced exploitation from dishonest trade credit partners 
in international markets. The goldsmith recounted his story in international markets:  
“…talking about the foreign businesses some of them are crooks. Beginning they were 
cheating on me and complaining that the gold is not up to standard and so I got an agent 
abroad who would say that okay I would be there in a few minutes then immediately the 
customer would call back and say it is alright” (Case 16). 
 
In spite of the effectiveness of agents in the recovery of trade credit in international markets, 
the vast majority of the entrepreneurs trading outside West Africa disclosed that they could not 
hire agents due to the costs involved. Instead, they kept contacting the defaulters by phone or 
email and at times succeeded in getting the trade credit paid. Sadly, two of the entrepreneurs 
commented that some of their international partners had refused to respond to their calls and 
emails. The cocoa products processor shared her experience:  
 “I attended a trade fair at Excel in UK two years ago and one guy who have been buying the 
products met me there and requested for more products on credit but up to now I have not 
received the money, when I call him he doesn’t pick my calls any more. I know his details, 
where he was but he will not pick my call” (Case 15). 
  The refusal of international trade credit partners to communicate at times was re-echoed by 
half of the entrepreneurs. Consequently, to mitigate risks in international transactions, they 
reduced the amount of goods or cash offered on trade credit to their trading partners and also 
insisted on part payments. An entrepreneur explained her strategy in these words:  
“We used to give many credits and the money would never come back, sometimes up to 6 
months and so we realized that this affected our cash flow. Now I try to minimise risk, we 
offer a 50% credit to our foreign customers. I also take insurance for loss or damage in transit” 
(Case 7).  
These strategies allowed majority of the entrepreneurs to reduce the risks from free-riders in 
international markets. Table 4 presents a summary of the strategies used by entrepreneurs in 
enforcing trade credit with their partners.  
 
Conclusions 
       This article explored the processes of trust development and enforcement of trade credit 
agreements in entrepreneurial trade credit relationships in a developing economy context. The 
findings identified three broad areas in which entrepreneurs develop trust in trade credit 
relationships. We identified the embeddedness of entrepreneurship as a key aspect of the trust 
development process. While the results confirm existing studies on the embeddedness of 
entrepreneurs in institutional contexts, it sheds more light on how entrepreneurs’ trust 
development processes and trade credit enforcement were shaped by cultural specific norms. 
   This article also investigated the processes of trust development in entrepreneurial trade 
credit relationships in Ghana. It shows that trust was developed based on a partner’s honesty, 
capacity to pay, willingness to pay and liquidity risks posed the partner. The entrepreneurs, 
therefore, evaluated the actions or behaviour of their partners based mostly on previous 
transactions (Dietz, Gillepsie and Chao 2010).  Partners who had consistently shown that they 
were honest and truthful, by keeping their promises to pay trade credit as promised were 
regarded to be honest. Honesty, however, meant more than paying trade credit on time as it 
also implied that the partner kept promises and did not deceive or mislead the entrepreneur. 
Although trust enhances trade credit in developing countries with weak institutions, there is 
limited empirical evidence and integrated framework on the development and management of 
trust in trade credit relationships (Wu et al, 2014).  
This article, therefore, bridges the gap in the academic literature through the exploration of 
how the specific processes and dimensions of trust are developed in trade credit relationships 
in a developing country context. Using extant literature, a conceptual framework was initially 
developed which integrated and compared trust processes and dimensions from both 
developed and developing economies. The conceptual framework therefore applies to both 
developed and developing economy on trade credit relationship development. The framework 
was  then extended based on the primary data to develop a comprehensive empirical model, 
which effectively integrates trust processes and dimensions in entrepreneurial trade credit 
relationships in a developing economy context. The novelty of these findings can be found in 
the embeddedness of the entrepreneurs in their institutions and the specific trust processes and 
dimensions developed as shown in the framework (Figure 4). The empirical framework shows 
that in Ghana, a context of weak legal institutions, entrepreneurs develop personal trust and 
parallel institutional trust based on norms of social and cultural institutions such as 
family/kinship and friendships, community and trade associations and religion to provide trade 
credit to their customers or suppliers and to enforce trade credit agreements. Furthermore, trust 
in local institutions such as trade associations and religious institutions was particularly 
important in distant markets in Ghana and West Africa, where there was a lack of previous 
knowledge of potential trade credit partners (Amoako and Lyon, 2014).  The empirical model 
therefore highlighted vast differences between the processes and practices of trust in trade 
credit relationship between the developed and developing economies (see figure2).  
 
However, the study also identified rich evidence of how entrepreneurs in Ghana and West 
Africa employ trust in a subjective approach to manage liquidity issues and to determine the 
continuity or discontinuity of trade credit relationships. The findings illustrated that timely 
payment with credible explanation or reason based on circumstances beyond the partner’s 
control could lead to the continuation of trade credit relationships despite default in a payment 
agreement. It also identified an approach of using the part payment to offset risks to liquidity 
when partners are not well known.  
     The majority of the entrepreneurs however, made it explicit that they visited their partners 
to collect information on their capacity to pay based on the value of their assets and or on their 
reputation. This approach is very important since in Ghana and West Africa, there is limited 
public information on the credit history of individuals and firms (World Bank 2015). 
Therefore, knowing where trade credit partners work and live allow the entrepreneurs to 
control their trade credit partners in cases of default. This shows how entrepreneurs as agents 
respond to institutional constraints to manage trade credit relationships in a developing 
economy context.  
Interestingly, entrepreneurs’ approaches to lending trade credit to their partners in these weak 
legal contexts are similar to relationship lending approaches used by banks. In relationship 
lending, banks gather different types of private information from the owner manager, the firm 
and the local community in order to assess the risks associated with lending to that particular 
firm (see Berger and Udell 1995; Berger and Udell 2006; Moro, Lucas, and Kodwani 2010). 
 
The results of the exploratory study suggest that in the midst of minimal legal protection in 
Ghana, entrepreneurs rely on trust in order to offer trade credit to their trading partners and 
also to enforce trade credit agreements. This observation is not very different from a number 
of African countries where entrepreneurs are found to rely on trust-based informal 
relationships to leverage relational resources in enhancing trade and internationalisation (Ibeh, 
Wilson, and Chizema 2012). In Asia, the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh and many other micro 
credit providers also rely on trust in social relations to sustain the provision of micro finance to 
entrepreneurs who are mostly poor and therefore lack access to formal bank finance (Dowla 
2006). Chinese entrepreneurs who have immigrated to Brazil also rely on trust and social 
relations to access informal finance (Sheng and Mendes-Da-Silva 2014). These informal forms 
of finance enable entrepreneurs and smaller businesses with limited access to formal forms of 
finance to increase sales (Fisman and Love 2003) and also get access to reliable supplies and 
international markets. Thus, the empirical model in this study although developed from the 
West African developing countries, it could be applied to other developing economies as a 
basis for understanding trust in trade credits relationship; however, such applications must 
consider the differences in institutional contexts, norms and expectations in social relations, 
trade associations, sector industries and markets in these developing economies. 
 
        The findings of the study have both theoretical and practical implications. Theoretically, 
this article contributes to the literature on trust in entrepreneurship and small business finance 
using a qualitative approach to capture and develop a framework of trust in SME trade credit 
relationships. The article proposes a well-developed model for developing and managing trust 
in trade credit relationships in developing countries. In developing trade credit relationship, it 
is important that entrepreneurs understand the different trust processes and dimensions to 
employ. Thus, researchers can use the model for further research.   
It also contributes to an understanding of the importance of institutional factors in trust 
research- an area where there have been calls for more research recently (Li 2016b; Welter 
2011). The findings, therefore, illustrate that the conceptualisation of trust may differ based on 
institutional contexts and especially on norms and expectations in social relations, trade 
associations, sector industries and markets.  
     The extant literature has mostly focused on analysing the influence of trust and 
trustworthiness in bank lending. However, there is limited research on the role of trust in trade 
credit which remains a major source of finance for entrepreneurs and SMEs particularly in 
developing economies (see Moro, Lucas , and Kodwani 2012; Demirgüç-Kunt and 
Maksimovic 2001; Wilson 2014; Carbo-Valverdes, Rodriguez-Fernandez, and Udell 2016). 
This article therefore, enhances our understanding of the risks that entrepreneurs from 
developing economies may encounter in international business and how trust in relationships 
facilitates the provision of trade credit and enforcement of trade credit agreements. 
 
The findings also have practical and policy implications. It shows that in weak institutional 
contexts, entrepreneurs involved in international business rely on social relations and 
indigenous institutions to build trust, and offer and enforce trade credit agreements. 
Consequently, for entrepreneurs selling and buying across cultures in these contexts, there is a 
need to understand the different social and indigenous institutions and their norms that form 
the basis for trust building in trade credit relationships. Furthermore, to entrepreneurs who 
seek informal forms of finance from trade partners, this article shows that honesty, 
truthfulness, keeping promises and making timely payments of previous trade credit, as well as 
the capacity to pay and reputation, are important factors that influence the creditor’s decisions 
to offer or not to offer trade credit to prospective partners.  
 
      By highlighting the risks and uncertainty encountered by smaller businesses in their trade 
credit relationships, this article further highlights the need for policy makers in Ghana, West 
Africa and other developing nations to embark on reforming the formal institutions that can 
support enterprise development. Policy makers must focus on reforming the legal systems, 
reducing tax burdens and lowering interest rates to provide affordable finance to SMEs. The 
policy should also consider implementing credit guarantee schemes for smaller businesses 
involved in international business. Policy makers and donors should also support the role of 
indigenous institutions such as trade associations since the evidence in this paper show that 
these associations may serve as alternatives to the courts in commercial contract enforcement 
and therefore facilitate SMEs growth. 
 
     This study has a number of limitations that offer opportunities for future research. This 
study explored the development and management of trade credit relationships in a developing 
context using a qualitative study approach to develop an empirical model. Future studies could 
test the model using a quantitative approach to extend the study in multiple developing 
countries. This study could explore how the trust processes and dimensions in SMEs trade 
credit enforcement and relationships may differ in the different contexts and social norms of 
developing countries. Further, comparative studies using the conceptual framework could be 
conducted to compare trust development, management, processes and dimension in developed 
and developing countries. Future research could also explore how trust in trade credit 
relationships impacts on the financial performance of SMEs in developing economy contexts. 
Trust is fragile and its violation can lead to the termination of trade credit relationships; 
although, the present study explored how trust in trade credit relationship impacts on 
enforcement and performance; future research could explore trust violations and trust repairs 
within SME trade credit relationships across different cultures. Furthermore, such a study 
could probe into the liquidity issues in trade credit relationship development and management 
in both developing and developed economies. Such a study could focus on exploring in detail 
the differences in the causes and effects of liquidity issues in these economies and how their 
institutional and social contexts affect the development of trust in trade credits enforcement to 
confirm and extend the present findings in different context and sectors. 
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Appendix 1: Interview Schedule 
Interview Protocol for Trust Development and Trade Credit Enforcement in 
Entrepreneurial Relationships 
1. What are the sources of loans and finance for your business and can you explain why you 
rely on those sources?  
2. Could you please describe any key customer or supplier relationships in Ghana and 
abroad? 3. How do you pay for goods/services supplied by your key supplier? 
4. How do you get paid for the goods/services supplied to your key customer?  
5. What company factors do you consider before deciding to offer trade credit to the 
owner/manager of a partnering company? 
6. What personal attributes, actions and behaviour of your partner enable you to develop and 
maintain trust in trade credit relationships?  
7. Could you please describe how you arrive at a decision to offer trade credit to your 
partners? 
8. What are the advantages and disadvantages of trade credit to your business? 
9.Please can you recall giving trade credit to a customer or supplier who defaulted, if yes 
what did you do? 
10. Do you use the courts in settling trade credit agreements? If so why? If not how do you 
settle trade credit disputes with your partners?  
11. What is the role of trust in developing and maintaining trade credit relationships with 
partners? 
12. How much was your total sales for the past 12 months? 
13. How much of your goods/services were given on credit within the past 12 months
Table 1: Profiles of Cases 
Case Empl
oyees 
 Activity Sector  Main International Markets Sales per year 
(USD) 
Total value of 
goods/services given 
on credit last 12 
months (USD) 
Interviewee 
1 37       Hotel and conference 
facilities 
Service        USA, UK, EU 748,000 251,000 Manager 
2 12        Hotel Service        USA, EU 235,000 85,000 Owner/Manager 
3 9        Retail of  Kente Service       USA, UK 34,000 8,000 Owner/manager 
4 15    Hotel Service       USA, EU 301,000 98,000 Manager 
5 38 Processing of spices  Manufacturing USA 190,000 98,000 Owner/manager 
6 25    Manufacturer of  beads  Manufacturing  Canada, USA, UK 127,000 73,000 Owner/manager 
7 25      Processing of shea 
butter  
Manufacturing USA 145,000 78,000 Owner/manager 
8 20 Processing of fruits Manufacturing Switzerland, China 103,000 87,000 Owner/manager 
9 7 Wholesaler of Beads  Service Senegal, Burkina Faso, Nigeria, 
Togo 
21,000 7,400 Owner/manager  
10 15        Engineering Company  Service  Cote D’Ivoire,  Burkina Faso, 
Togo  
35,000 16,000 Owner/manager  
11 6       Hotel Service Cote Divoire, Nigeria, Burkina 
Faso, Mali,  
168,000 59,000 Owner/ Manager 
12 20       Retailer of petroleum 
products 
Service  Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger 201,000 31,000 Owner/Manager 
13 9  Fashion designer Manufacturing  Mali, Burkina Faso, Nigeria 48,000 12,000 Owner/manager 
14 10     Fashion designer Manufacturing  Togo, Nigeria, Burkina Faso,  52,000 15,500 Owner/manager 
15 15          Processing of cocoa Manufacturing  South Africa, Nigeria,  87,000 50,000 Owner/manager  
16 12    Goldsmith Manufacturing Burkina Faso, Cote Divoire,  
Nigeria 
108,000 68,000 Owner/Manager 
 
        Table 2 
  Illustrative quotes for dimensions of trust in SME trade credit relationships 
Honesty  
Abide by one’s own words 
 
Keeping promises to pay 
“Yes, but I give credit to somebody who has honesty, not trying to cut corners or trying to alter 
documents as other would do. I should be able to trust the person when he says one, it’s one or when it’s 
black, is black” (Number 5).   
  “I don't give credit at the start, it's like a student, you test the customers based on their payment, so their 
payment will tell me not to credit them again. This is how I go about it, it’s all about payment” (Number 
9) 
Capacity to pay  
Possession of valuable personal and 
business assets 
 
Show evidence of high sales 
“We don’t agree to every proposal for credit. First we visit the company to see where the company is 
located, assess their assets and check if what the manager told us about the company’s ability to pay is 
true” (Number12). 
“Yes, “Yes, I visit them in their shops and watch how much they sell to customers” (Number 15). 
Willingness to pay  





“I give credit but it’s only when we know the manager very well, I mean he invited us so we know his 
house and his work place” (Number 7).   
“My customers talk to me regularly and if there are problems they tell me when they will pay my money 
I have worked with them so many years” (Number 2). 
 
 



























“This particular customer has never missed payment and so with her I trust that I will get my money 
when I need it. She is a very reliable customer” (Case 1).  
 
“To avoid locking up too much money with customers we insist on payment of at least half of the cost of 
the products sold and those who agree are those that we trust and supply them” (Case 3). 
 







Demonstrate family atmosphere 




“You see we talk to them, they visit us, we also visit them and we have developed some kind of family 
relationship” (Number 10). 
 
“We talk and work as a family, we lean on each other because he needs me and I need him. He invites me 
and I also invite him to social functions like funerals and weddings and any family event” (Number 4). 
 
“The trust you have for people will lead to that; when we’ve gotten to know each other, because we're 
friends we could be helping each other” (Number 14). 
 
Trade association /industry 
norms 
 
Demonstrate membership of trade 
association 
 
Demonstrate adherence to Industry 
norms 
 
“I am a member of Tailors and Dress-makers Association and we were all informed at the meeting about 
the trade fair and it is at the fair that I met my customers from Nigeria and Burkina Faso” (Number 13). 
  
“We give credit. Locally in this business it’s a norm, you just have to do that to get business” (Number 1).  
Religious Norms  
Demonstrate religious principles 
 
Demonstrate faith in God, Allah 
and indigenous deities 
“I believe in God and so it is better for me to pray and leave my debtor with God it is better than going to 
court” (Number 2).  
“Sometimes I go to the pastor of my supplier and ask them to talk to him. I also remember one time I 
threatened to take an egg and call the local gods to curse her and she was afraid so she came to pay my 
money back to me” (Number 3) 
Reputation  
Endorsement from employees and 
family members 
 
Endorsement from association or 
community members 
“Most of them even invite me to their houses to let me know where they are. When I visit, I ask some few 
people around you, if they say you're trustworthy then I will give the goods to you on credit” (Number 15). 
 
“I supply beads on credit to a customer… He was recommended to me as very good in the (export) sector 













 Table 4: Strategies used by entrepreneurs to enforce trade credit in weak institutions   
                             Strategy Used Market(s) Sample Quotes from Cases in Domestic, West 
Africa and International Markets 
• Contacted family members to solicit 




“…Sometimes I could also go to the husband, mother or 
any family member to complain if I know them and in 
all such cases the money is paid back to me” (Case 7) 
• Relied on shared religious values, 
religious leaders (pastors, Imams, 
fetish priests), prayers and threats to 
invoke curses from God, Allah or 
traditional gods  
• Domestic/West 
Africa 
“The court processes is too long and then you spend a 
lot of money; so it is better for me to pray and leave 
everything into God's hand and ….he will rebuke every 
devourer for my sake” (Case 10).  
• Relied on trade association leaders to 
resolve payment disputes and enforce 
trade credit payments. 
• Domestic/West 
Africa 
“….I belong to the association there, they settle payment 
problems quickly and free of charge” (Case 14). 
• Removed goods already supplied on 
trade credit forcefully from the shelves 
of customers 
• Domestic “No I did not go to court because of the time …instead 
went to her shop and removed my beads since some 
were still in the shop” case 9) 
• Relied on intermediaries such as 
embassy staff and trade fair organisers 
to resolve delayed payment disputes 
• West Africa 
 
“…He delayed me … Even it was the organisers of the 
fair who intervened otherwise maybe he wouldn't have 
given me all the money” (Case 13). 
 
• Used agents to verify customers’ false 
claims of defective goods and that led 
to delayed trade credit being paid 
• International “I got an agent abroad who would say that okay I would 
be there in a few minutes then immediately the customer 
would call back and say it is alright” (Case 16). 
• Use repeated telephone calls or emails 
to chase after default trade credit 
payments 
• West Africa/ 
International 
“When the customer delayed payments for a long time 
I called him three four times a week on the phone. I 
also sent many emails and he probably got angry and 
paid my money back” (Case 5).   













    Table 2 
  Illustrative quotes for dimensions of trust in SME trade credit relationships 
Honesty  
Abide by one’s own words 
 
Keeping promises to pay 
“Yes, but I give credit to somebody who has honesty, not trying to cut corners or trying to alter 
documents as other would do. I should be able to trust the person when he says one, it’s one or when it’s 
black, is black” (Number 5).   
  “I don't give credit at the start, it's like a student, you test the customers based on their payment, so their 
payment will tell me not to credit them again. This is how I go about it, it’s all about payment” (Number 
9) 
Capacity to pay  
Possession of valuable personal and 
business assets 
 
Show evidence of high sales 
“We don’t agree to every proposal for credit. First we visit the company to see where the company is 
located, assess their assets and check if what the manager told us about the company’s ability to pay is 
true” (Number12). 
“Yes, “Yes, I visit them in their shops and watch how much they sell to customers” (Number 15). 
Willingness to pay  





“I give credit but it’s only when we know the manager very well, I mean he invited us so we know his 
house and his work place” (Number 7).   
“My customers talk to me regularly and if there are problems they tell me when they will pay my money 
















Demonstrate family atmosphere 




“You see we talk to them, they visit us, we also visit them and we have developed some kind of family 
relationship” (Number 10). 
 
“We talk and work as a family, we lean on each other because he needs me and I need him. He invites me 
and I also invite him to social functions like funerals and weddings and any family event” (Number 4). 
 
“The trust you have for people will lead to that; when we’ve gotten to know each other, because we're 










“This particular customer has never missed payment and so with her I trust that I will get my money 
when I need it. She is a very reliable customer” (Case 1).  
 
“To avoid locking up too much money with customers we insist on payment of at least half of the cost of 
the products sold and those who agree are those that we trust and supply them” (Case 3). 
 
 
Trade association /industry 
norms 
 
Demonstrate membership of trade 
association 
 
Demonstrate adherence to Industry 
norms 
“I am a member of Tailors and Dress-makers Association and we were all informed at the meeting about 
the trade fair and it is at the fair that I met my customers from Nigeria and Burkina Faso” (Number 13). 
  
“We give credit. Locally in this business it’s a norm, you just have to do that to get business” (Number 1).  
Religious Norms  
Demonstrate religious principles 
 
Demonstrate faith in God, Allah 
and indigenous deities 
“I believe in God and so it is better for me to pray and leave my debtor with God it is better than going to 
court” (Number 2).  
“Sometimes I go to the pastor of my supplier and ask them to talk to him. I also remember one time I 
threatened to take an egg and call the local gods to curse her and she was afraid so she came to pay my 
money back to me” (Number 3) 
Reputation  
Endorsement from employees and 
family members 
 
Endorsement from association or 
community members 
“Most of them even invite me to their houses to let me know where they are. When I visit, I ask some few 
people around you, if they say you're trustworthy then I will give the goods to you on credit” (Number 15). 
 
“I supply beads on credit to a customer… He was recommended to me as very good in the (export) sector 
and everybody in the association knows that” (Number 6). 
 
Table 4: Strategies used by entrepreneurs to enforce trade credit in weak institutions 
 
                             Strategy Used Market(s) Sample Quotes from Cases in Domestic, West 
Africa and International Markets 
• Contacted family members to solicit 




“…Sometimes I could also go to the husband, mother or 
any family member to complain if I know them and in 
all such cases the money is paid back to me” (Case 7) 
• Relied on shared religious values, 
religious leaders (pastors, Imams, 
fetish priests), prayers and threats to 
invoke curses from God, Allah or 
traditional gods  
• Domestic/We
st Africa 
“The court processes is too long and then you spend a 
lot of money; so it is better for me to pray and leave 
everything into God's hand and ….he will rebuke every 
devourer for my sake” (Case 10).  
• Relied on trade association leaders to 
resolve payment disputes and enforce 
trade credit payments. 
• Domestic/We
st Africa 
“….I belong to the association there, they settle payment 
problems quickly and free of charge” (Case 14). 
• Removed goods already supplied on 
trade credit forcefully from the shelves 
of customers 
• Domestic “No I did not go to court because of the time …instead 
went to her shop and removed my beads since some 
were still in the shop” case 9) 
• Relied on intermediaries such as 
embassy staff and trade fair organisers 
to resolve delayed payment disputes 
• West Africa 
 
“…He delayed me … Even it was the organisers of the 
fair who intervened otherwise maybe he wouldn't have 
given me all the money” (Case 13). 
 
• Used agents to verify customers’ false 
claims of defective goods and that led 
to delayed trade credit being paid 
• International “I got an agent abroad who would say that okay I would 
be there in a few minutes then immediately the customer 
would call back and say it is alright” (Case 16). 
• Use repeated telephone calls or emails 
to chase after default trade credit 
payments 
• West Africa/ 
International 
“When the customer delayed payments for a long time 
I called him three four times a week on the phone. I 
also sent many emails and he probably got angry and 
paid my money back” (Case 5).   
 
